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Abstract:
We extend a standard, rational expectation model of trade to incorporate the possibility
of individual investors delegating their trades to an informed nancial intermediary. In
the presence of delegated trade, we show that a rms risk premium is a function of both
the rms exposure to a common risk factor and idiosyncratic characteristics of the rms
information environment. We show that even in a large economy, priced risks can manifest in
the form of both idiosyncratic rm characteristics and common risk factors; as a consequence,
factor-based asset pricing tests cannot rule out that a particular risk is priced.
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1 Introduction
There is an ongoing debate on whether characteristics of a rms information environment
are priced. Existing economic theory suggests that, in large economies populated by rational
investors, the rms information environment has no e¤ect on the risk premium incremental
to the rms exposure to common risk factors, i.e., factor-betas. Based on this theory, a large
empirical literature examines whether the quality of public information (e.g., accounting
quality) represents a separate, common risk factor (see Shevlin, 2013 for a review).1
A standard assumption in this literature is that individual investors (both informed and
uninformed) trade on their own accounts, or self-direct their trades. In this paper, we
extend a standard, rational expectation model of trade to incorporate the possibility that
individual investors can delegate their trades to a privately informed nancial intermediary:
for example, an institutional investor. We show that delegation results in characteristics
of the rms information environment specically, the qualities of public and private in-
formation and idiosyncratic cash ow volatility  a¤ecting the risk premium incremental
to factor-betas. In our model, priced risk manifests in the form of both idiosyncratic rm
characteristics and factor-betas: as a consequence, factor-based asset pricing tests cannot
rule out that a particular risk is priced.
We begin our analysis by considering the standard benchmark case of a single rm, where
the rms cash ow is comprised of two components: a systematic component resulting
from exposure to a common risk factor and an idiosyncratic component. We assume the
economy is populated by a large number of rational, atomistic investors; each individual
investor behaves as a price taker and self-directs his trades. In this setting, we show that
the expression for the risk premium (the di¤erence between a rms expected cash ow and
1 By common risk factorwe refer to an aggregate variable that takes the same value for all rms, e.g.,
one of the three Fama-French factors. By factor-betawe refer to the rms exposure, or covariance, with
a common risk factor. By characteristic of a rm or rm characteristic, we refer to an idiosyncratic
attribute of the rm, e.g., a rms accounting quality.
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its expected price) e¤ectively reduces to that of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).
Next, we assume that an exogenous fraction of investors in the economy delegate their
trades to a nancial intermediary who has private information about the rm. Large
economies generally result in perfect competition and, for this reason, characteristics of the
rms information environment are not thought to a¤ect the rms risk premium incremental
to factor-betas. However, the presence of an intermediary prevents the seeming inevitability
of a large economy becoming perfectly competitive. The intuition for this result is that, as
the economy grows, the intermediarys client base (e.g., assets under management) grows
in tandem, and thus even though any single investors e¤ect on price declines as the economy
gets larger, the intermediarys e¤ect on price does not. As the economy grows, any (poten-
tial) decline in the intermediarys e¤ect on price is o¤set by a corresponding increase in the
intermediarys larger aggregate demand order that results from trading on behalf of more
clients. The ongoing presence of this market imperfection results in imperfect competition
being sustained despite the fact that the economy is large. Because the economy continues
to be imperfectly competitive, the qualities of public and private information and the rms
idiosyncratic cash ow volatility a¤ect the risk premium incremental to the factor-betas.
Finally, we extend the model to allow the following elements to be endogenous: (i)
the fraction of investors who delegate their trades; (ii) the number of intermediaries; and
(iii) the fee that intermediaries charge their clients. Here, one can think of our analysis
as extending Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) to include features from Kyle (1989). Rather
than have investors pay a xed fee to acquire private information (as in Grossman and
Stiglitz, 1980), we assume that investors pay a xed fee to delegate their trading decisions
to a privately informed nancial intermediary, where the fee is endogenously determined by
competition among the intermediaries.
One way to motivate this modeling approach is to appeal to the notion that the costs of
acquiring private information are so large that no single, individual investor could bear the
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entirety of the costs. Instead, the chief role of the intermediary is to acquire private infor-
mation, trade on behalf of his clients, and then charge each individual client a very small
fee as compensation for his services. The collection of small fees reimburses the intermedi-
ary for large information acquisition costs. Given the signicant presence of institutional
investors in large economies, we believe our analysis of delegated trade o¤ers a more com-
pelling story about how information is gathered and disseminated in a large economy with
atomistic investors.2
Our analysis integrates the economics literature on delegated trade with the accounting
literature on the e¤ect of accounting information on asset prices. Several studies in the eco-
nomics literature examine the implications of investors delegating their investment decisions
to a nancial intermediary. Broadly stated, this literature attempts to understand the e¢ -
ciency of such arrangements (e.g., Admati and Peiderer, 1990; Garcia and Vanden, 2009;
Kyle et al., 2011) and how the incentives of portfolio managers a¤ect equilibrium prices
(see Cuoco and Kaniel, 2011, for a review). However, this literature does not distinguish
between di¤erent sources of priced risk: factor-betas or characteristics of the information
environment.
There are many studies in the accounting literature that examine the pricing of public and
private information, but do so from the perspective that investorstrades are self-directed.
Self-directed trade among atomistic investors in large economies typically results in perfect
competition, and perfectly competitive markets typically have the feature that a rms infor-
mation environment does not a¤ect the premium incremental to the rms factor-beta (e.g.,
Hughes et al., 2007; Lambert et al., 2007; Gao, 2010).3 For example, Lambert et al. (2007)
2 French (2008) suggests that the fraction of common equity in the U.S. indirectly held by individual
investors through-open ended mutual funds increased from 4.6% in 1980 to 32.4% in 2007, whereas the
fraction of common equity directly held by individual investors declined from 47.9% to 21.5% over the same
period.
3 Chen et al. (2013) and Clinch (2013) study similar settings, but in the presence of departures from
rationality (i.e. non-Bayesian behavior).
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posit a model of perfect competition where the quality of public information a¤ects expected
returns exclusively through factor-loadings. In contrast, Lambert et al. (2012) study the
pricing of information in a setting where the market is imperfectly competitive as a conse-
quence of some investors anticipating the e¤ect of their demand on price (see also Caskey et
al., 2014; Lambert and Verrecchia, 2014). However, as these investors become small in rela-
tion to the size of the economy, the anticipated e¤ect vanishes, the market becomes perfectly
competitive, and public and private information do not a¤ect the risk premium incremental
to factor-betas. Relative to this literature (see Bertomeu and Cheynel, 2014, for a review),
the distinguishing feature of our analysis is that we consider the possibility of delegated
trade. Delegated trade inhibits a large economy from becoming perfectly competitive; as a
consequence, characteristics of the rms information environment manifest in asset prices
incremental to the rms factor-beta despite the economy being large.
It is easy to imagine a circumstance where the risk premium is characterized exclusively in
terms of factor-betas (e.g., the CAPM). However, given the mounting empirical evidence that
rm characteristics a¤ect asset prices, the purpose of this paper is to identify and examine
a circumstance in which characteristics of the rms information environment are priced
incremental to factor-betas, despite the economy being large. The insights from our model
have several implications for empirical work, which we discuss in detail in Section 6. First, to
the extent that a particular rm characteristic is related to the quality of public information,
the quality of private information, and/or the rms idiosyncratic cash ow volatility, our
analysis suggests that the characteristic will be priced incremental to factor-betas. Second,
because priced risks can manifest in the form of both idiosyncratic rm characteristics and
factor-betas, our results suggest that factor-based asset pricing tests cannot rule out that a
particular risk is priced only that it is priced as a common risk factor. Third, our results
suggest considerable variation in the e¤ect of public information on illiquidity and expected
returns. For example, our analysis suggests the e¤ect of public information on illiquidity
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and expected returns varies with the quality of private information, with systematic cash
ow volatility, and with the costs borne by the intermediary. Finally, our analysis provides
insight on how the information environment inuences individual investors decisions to
delegate their trades.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of our
analysis. Section 3 considers the role of delegated trade assuming an exogenous fraction of
investors delegate trades to a single information intermediary. Section 4 extends the model to
a setting where the following elements are endogenous: the fraction of investors who delegate
trades; the number of intermediaries; and the fee that intermediaries charge to their clients.
Section 5 extends the model to a setting where investors can trade the common factor.
Section 6 discusses the implications of our model for empirical work. Section 7 concludes.
2 Overview
2.1 Benchmark case
In this section, we discuss the setup of our model and our assumptions. We do this in the
context of the standard benchmark case of a single risky asset (e.g., a rm). To start, we
solve for the risk premium in the absence of delegated trade, and show that the expression
for the risk premium e¤ectively reduces to that of the CAPM.
Trading takes place in a one-period capital market comprised of N rational investors,
each with negative exponential utility with constant absolute risk tolerance  . Investors can
trade shares of a riskless bond, whose return and price we normalize to 0 and 1, respectively,
and shares of a risky asset. Shares of the risky asset are traded at a market clearing price
~Pa and shareholders realize an uncertain terminal cash ow of ~Va after trade occurs, where
henceforth we use a tilde, i.e., ~, to denote a random variable. The risk premium investors
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demand to hold shares of the risky asset is dened as the di¤erence between the expected
cash ow and expected price, E
h
~Va   ~Pa
i
.
We assume the risky assets cash ow is comprised of two components: a systematic
component resulting from exposure to a common risk factor and an idiosyncratic component.
We represent the risky assets cash ow by
~Va = a +   ~F + ~";
where a and  are xed parameters, ~F has a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance
2F , and ~" has a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 
2
" and is independent of ~F .
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We refer to  as the risky assets factor-beta,2F as systematic cash ow volatility,and 
2
"
as idiosyncratic cash ow volatility.As is standard in the literature, 2" represents investors
assessment of idiosyncratic cash ow volatility. Investorsassessment of idiosyncratic cash
ow volatility is driven by the sum of two (idiosyncratic) forces: the real volatility of cash
ow and common knowledge about that cash ow. This implies that either a reduction in
real volatility or an increase in the quality of public information about volatility works to
decrease 2".
Consider the standard benchmark case where investors have homogenous beliefs and the
market is perfectly competitive (i.e., there is no private information and all investors are
price takers). It is straightforward to show that the expression for the risk premium reduces
to
E
h
~Va   ~Pa
i
=
1
N
 
22F + 
2
"

: (1)
In e¤ect, the risky asset is priced based on its expected cash ow less a discount for the
volatility of the risky assets cash ow and the economys aggregate risk tolerance (i.e.,
4 Without loss of generality, we assume cash ow is generated by exposure to a single risk factor. The
results extend to a multifactor specication of cash ow with multiple factor-betas.
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N). This equation makes clear that the risk premium will vanish as N becomes large (i.e.,
N ! 1) and the risky asset will be priced at the expected value of terminal cash ow.
The intuition for this result is that the economys aggregate risk tolerance gets progressively
larger as the economy grows, while total risk stays xed. In other words, in a large economy,
the only risk that is meaningful is the risk that grows with the economy. This theme pervades
the literature.
Consider the classic CAPM. Although the CAPM is couched in terms of returns and
not cash ows, using a standard technique along the lines of Fama (1976) one can convert
the CAPM from a model of returns to a model of cash ows. In the CAPM, in order for
systematic risk to be meaningful, the risk associated with the systematic component of
cash ow must grow in proportion to the number of investors: in other words, it must be the
case that 2F = N
2
f , where 
2
f represents the level of risk per capita (or per investor). The
chief takeaway from the CAPM is that only the risk associated with the systematic portion
of cash ow grows with the economy, and thus only this portion is priced in a large economy.
Risk associated with the idiosyncratic portion of cash ow does not grow with the economy,
and thus its e¤ect on price vanishes in a large economy.
Within the context of the above example and similar to the CAPM, suppose the risk
associated with the common factor grows in proportion to the number of investors in the
economy (i.e., 2F = N
2
f). Then the expression for the risk premium reduces to
E
h
~Va   ~Pa
i
=
1

22f +
1
N
2": (2)
Here, risk associated with the common factor grows with the economy whereas risk associated
with the idiosyncratic portion does not. As such, as N becomes large, the risk premium
reduces to  122f and depends exclusively on the systematic portion. Note that in this case
the expression for the risk premium is e¤ectively that of the CAPM. This simple benchmark
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case provides the intuition for why, in economies comprised by a large number of investors,
the risk premium is only thought to be a function of factor-betas.
Henceforth, as in the CAPM, we assume that risk associated with the common factor
grows in proportion to the number of investors in the economy, and the risk associated with
the idiosyncratic portion of cash ow does not.
2.2 Delegated trade
Now we posit the existence of an exogenous fraction  2 [0; 1] of investors in the economy
who delegate their trading decisions to a single nancial intermediary. In Section 4 we allow
both italicized features to be endogenous.
The intermediary has private information about the idiosyncratic component of the risky
assets cash ow, ~". We represent the private information by the statistic ~y, where ~y is
dened by ~y = ~" + ~, where ~ has a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 2 (and
is independent of all other variables): ~ represents the error or noise in the intermediarys
private knowledge about ~". The intermediary does not share his private information with
his N clients, but rather trades on their behalf based on his private information. We
assume the intermediary trades to maximize each clients expected utility (conditional on
his private information) and treats each client identically (because all investors are identical
ex ante). Formally, the intermediary executes a single trade N DIa on behalf of his clients,
where DIa maximizes each clients expected utility conditional on the intermediarys private
information, ~y, and the fact that the intermediarys aggregate demand order is N DIa.
The execution of a single trade NDIa implies that in maximizing his clientsexpected
utility, the intermediary must take into consideration the impact his clientsaggregate de-
mand has on the price at which their trades are executed. This, in turn, results in market
competition being imperfect. Because NDIa grows with the size of the economy (through
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N), the market remains imperfect regardless of size. This market imperfection results in the
risk premium being a function of the product of Kyles  (which measures the extent to which
a unit of demand a¤ects the price at which trades are executed) and NDIa (aggregate de-
mand), where  and NDIa are endogenous variables that depend on both systematic and
idiosyncratic cash ow volatility. Because the product  NDIa does not vanish as the
economy becomes large, the risk premium depends on systematic and idiosyncratic risks.
Alternatively, when market competition is perfect, investors presume that their demands
have no e¤ect on price (which is equivalent to investors presuming that  = 0) and this pre-
sumption must hold in equilibrium. Thus, under perfect competition the e¤ect of  NDIa
on the risk premium is 0, and hence risks associated with systematic and idiosyncratic cash
ows remain additive and separable, such that the latter vanishes as N increases.
For example, if  in the absence of an intermediary  each of N investors directly
observed ~y and competed against one another, as well as against each of the (1  )N
uninformed investors, then the analysis would reduce to the seminal discussion in Grossman
and Stiglitz (1980) where percentages of informed and uninformed investors compete as price
takers (i.e., perfect competition). As in eqn. (2), the resulting risk premium would preserve
the additive and separable nature of the risks associated with systematic and idiosyncratic
cash ows such that the latter would vanish as N became large.
3 Capital market with delegated trade
3.1 Model setup
To review the assumptions to this point, we consider a one-period capital market comprised of
N identical (rational) investors, each with negative exponential utility and constant absolute
risk tolerance  . We assume that the risky asset has an (uncertain) cash ow ~Va represented
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by ~Va = a +  ~F + ~", where ~F and ~" have independent normal distributions with mean 0
and variances 2F = N
2
f and 
2
", respectively. We incorporate private information into our
model by assuming that a fraction  2 (0; 1), of the investors in the economy delegate their
trading decisions to an intermediary who has private information about the risky assets
idiosyncratic component, ~". The private information is represented by the statistic ~y, where
~y is dened by ~y = ~" + ~, where ~ has a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 2
(and is independent of all other variables). Henceforth we let " = 12" and  =
1
2
represent
the reciprocals of the variances of ~" and ~, respectively: as such, denotes the precision
of a random variable. Appendix A contains a table of notation used in the paper.
Conditional on ~y = y, investors assess the expected cash ow of the risky asset to be
E
h
~Vajy
i
= a +

"+
y with variance
V ar
h
~Vajy
i
= 2V ar
h
~F
i
+ V ar [~"jy] = N22f + (" + ) 1 : (3)
Let Dta represent an investors demand for a percentage of the risky assets cash ow,
where t 2 [I; U ] represents an investors type: t = I if the investor is a client of the interme-
diary and is thus informed,or t = U if the investor is not a client of the intermediary and
is thus uninformed.In keeping with the noisy rational expectations literature, we use the
naming conventions informedand uninformed,and refer to clients of the intermediary
as informedbecause their trades (while made by the intermediary) are based on private
information. Because informed investorsdemand contains private information, there has
to be noise to preclude the possibility of uninformed investors inferring this information
perfectly by conditioning their beliefs on the price of the asset.5 A standard technique for
adding noise in the (noisy) rational expectations literature is to assume that the supply of
the risky asset available for trade among informed and uninformed investors is uncertain.
5 While in principle there is nothing wrong with uninformed investors making perfect inferences, the
resulting equilibrium is thought to be uninteresting.
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We add uncertainty by assuming that N DIa + (1  )N DUa = ~x, where ~x has a normal
distribution with mean 1 and precision x (and is independent of all other variables).6
3.2 Informed investorsdemand
There are four key steps in our analysis. First, we determine informed investorsdemand for
the risky asset. Second, we determine uninformed investorsdemand. Third, we determine
the risky assets market-clearing price. Finally, we analyze the risky assets risk premium.
Recall that the intermediary treats all clients identically, and determines each clients de-
mand such that DIa maximizes the clients expected utility conditional on the intermediarys
private information, ~y. In coordinating trade, the intermediary conjectures the following as-
sociation among the price of the risky asset, Pa, the aggregate demand of informed investors,
N DIa, and the realization of the supply of the risky asset available for trade, ~x = x:
Pa = a +  +  (N DIa   x) ; (4)
where  and  are endogenous variables whose values need to be determined to ensure that
this conjecture is sustained in equilibrium.7 Here,  > 0 captures the extent to which the
aggregate demand of the informed investors, N DIa, a¤ects the price at which trades are
executed: as  increases (decreases), trade in the risky asset becomes more (less) illiquid.
While the realization of ~x is unknown, when price is in the form of eqn. (4) the intermediary
can infer the realization ~x = x by conditioning his beliefs on Pa in conjunction with choosing
6 Note that we express investorsdemands as a percentage of the risky assets cash ow, and then, by
virtue of assuming that the mean of ~x is 1, assume that 100% of the cash ow is available for trade on
average: this assumption is without loss of generality.
7 A belief implicit in the intermediarys conjecture about the behavior of price is that random supply,
~x, acts like a large, uninformed block trade; in other words, like a large, uninformed investor who, despite
being uninformed, nonetheless makes markets illiquid through the impact of his large demand on price. As
such and as in the case of a block trade the market will be illiquid (through x) even in the absence of
informed trade (i.e.,  = 0): see the discussion in Appendix C.
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DIa.8 Thus, without loss of generality we assume that the intermediary knowsx.
Conditional on ~y = y and ~x = x, the intermediary determines the DIa that maximizes a
clients expected utility by solving the following objective function:
max
DIa
E

  exp

 1

DIa

~Va   Pa

jy; x

= max
DIa
E

  exp

 1

DIa

~Va   a       (NDIa   x)

jy; x

: (5)
Using standard techniques for solving the moment-generating function of a normal distrib-
ution, this objective function can be re-expressed as:
max
DIa

  exp[ DIa 1

(E [~"jy]      (NDIa   x)) + D
2
Ia
2 2
V ar
h
~Vajy
i
])

: (6)
The DIa that maximizes this objective function is given by
DIa =
E [~"jy]   + x
2N+  1V ar
h
~Vajy
i ; (7)
where E [~"jy] = 
"+
y and V ar
h
~Vajy
i
is dened as in eqn. (3).
3.3 Uninformed investorsdemand
In this subsection we determine an uninformed investors demand for the risky asset. To
start, each uninformed investor solves an objective function that is similar to the objective
function of an informed investor, with two important distinctions. First, there are (1  )N
uninformed investors who compete with other investors to determine their demand orders.
Hence, as N becomes large, each uninformed investor acts as if his trade has no e¤ect on
8 For example, by conditioning his beliefs on price in conjunction with choosing DIa the informed investor
can compute the statistic ~ =  1

a +  + NDIa   ~Pa

, and this reveals x.
12
the price at which the trade will be executed, and thus behaves as a price taker. Second, an
uninformed investor does not observe ~y. Nonetheless, as is standard in the rational expecta-
tions literature, an uninformed investor infers ~y with noise by conditioning his beliefs on the
price of the risky asset; through this device, he gleans (with noise) the private information
that motivates informed investorstrades.
With regard to the latter, dene  as  =
N

"+
2N+ 1V ar[ ~Vajy] . When the price of the risky
asset is of the form Pa = a +  +  (NDIa   x), an uninformed investor can partially
infer ~y by conditioning his beliefs on Pa (and correctly anticipating  and ): specically, an
uninformed investor computes the statistic ~q, where
~q =
1

~Pa   a   

=
1


N ~DIa   ~x

= ~y  
 +

+ 1
N
V ar
h
~Vajy
i
~x

"+
: (8)
In e¤ect, eqn. (8) allows an uninformed investor to infer ~" with error or noise:
~q = ~"+ ~  
 +

+ 1
N
V ar
h
~Vajy
i
~x

"+
: (9)
Recall that E [~x] = 1 and V ar [~x] =  1x . Eqn. (9) implies that the statistic ~q has a normal
distribution with mean
E [~q] =  " + 


 + +
1
N
V ar
h
~Vajy
i
; (10)
and variance  1" + 
 1
 , where
 =
0B@ 1 +
0@+ 1N V ar
h
~Vajy
i

"+
1A2  1x
1CA
 1
: (11)
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An uninformed investor computes ~q to assess ~", which in turn is used to assess ~Va. Specically,
using standard Bayesian statistics, an uninformed investor assesses the expected cash ow
of the risky asset conditional on ~q = q to be
E
h
~Vajq
i
= a + E [~"jq] = a +

" + 
(q   E [~q]) ; (12)
and associates with this assessment a conditional variance
V ar
h
~Vajq
i
= N22f + (" + )
 1 : (13)
Conditional on ~q = q, an uninformed investor solves the following objective function
max
DUa
E

  exp

 1

DUa

~Va   Pa

jq

: (14)
Using standard techniques for solving the moment-generating function of a normal distrib-
ution, an uninformed investors objective function can be re-expressed as
max
DUa

  exp

 DUa 1


E
h
~Vajq
i
  Pa

+
D2Ua
2 2
V ar
h
~Vajq
i
: (15)
The DUa that maximizes this objective function is given by
DUa = 
E
h
~Vajq
i
  Pa
V ar
h
~Vajq
i ; (16)
where E
h
~Vajq
i
and V ar
h
~Vajq
i
are dened as in eqns. (12) and (13).
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3.4 An equilibrium 
In this subsection we determine the  that forms the basis for an equilibrium in our economy.
Market clearing requires that the supply of the risky asset available for trade among informed
and uninformed investors equals the demand, or
x = N DIa + (1  )N DUa = NDIa + (1  )N
a +

"+
(q   E [~q])  Pa
V ar
h
~Vajq
i : (17)
Recall that ~q = 1


N ~DIa   ~x

. Re-arranging terms in eqn. (17) yields
Pa   a =
V ar
h
~Vajq
i
(1  )N (NDIa   x) +

" + 
(q   E [~q])
=
V ar
h
~Vajq
i
(1  )N (NDIa   x) +

" + 
1

(NDIa   x)  
" + 
E [~q]
=
0@V ar
h
~Vajq
i
(1  )N +
2+ 1
N
V ar
h
~Vajy
i
"+


"+
1A (NDIa   x)  
" + 
E [~q] : (18)
Recall that the intermediary conjectures that price is of the form Pa = a++ (NDIa   x).
For this conjecture to be sustained, in eqn. (18) it must be the case that
 =
V ar
h
~Vajq
i
(1  )N +
 (" + )
 (" + )

2+
1
N
V ar
h
~Vajy
i
: (19)
Because  appears on both sides of eqn. (19) (both directly and indirectly because  is a
function of ), dene  (;  ; "; ; f ; x; ; ;N) as
 (; ) =  
V ar
h
~Vajq
i
(1  )N  
 (" + )
 (" + )

2+
1
N
V ar
h
~Vajy
i
: (20)
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To determine an equilibrium , say, substitute the expression for  in eqn. (11) into eqn.
(20) and then solve for  (; ) = 0. Having determined , one can solve for:  in eqn.
(11); and  by noting that eqn. (18) requires  =   
"+
E [~q], which implies from eqn. (10)
that
 =
 ( + ")
" (   )

+
1
N
V ar
h
~Vajy
i
: (21)
In short, an equilibrium in our economy is characterized by a (positive)  that solves
 (; ) = 0, and the solutions to  in eqn. (11) and  in eqn. (21).
In Appendix B we prove the following proposition.
Proposition 1. There exists a unique, positive  that solves  (; ) = 0 where  (; ) is
specied as in eqn. (20). In turn, the  can be used to solve for a (unique)  in eqn. (11)
and (unique)  in eqn. (21).
3.5 The risk premium
Recall that the price of the risky asset is Pa = a +  +  (NDIa   x). This expression
represents the risky assets realized price: that is, the end-of-period price based on the
realizations of the random variables ~y = y, ~x = x, and ~DIa = DIa. Because , , and
DIa are functions of " and , realized price clearly depends on " and . This does not
imply, however, that the risky assets risk premium depends on " and . For example, let
 (;  ; "; ; f ; x; ; ;N) represent the risky assets risk premium:  (; ) is dened by
 (; ) = E
h
~Va   ~Pa
i
=     E
h
N  ~DIa   ~x
i
:9 (22)
9 As will become clear below, it is useful to dene  (; ) in eqn. (22) in terms of the 8 exogenous
parameters that specify our economy (i.e.,  , ", , f , x, , , N) and the variable , despite the fact
that  is endogenous and thus is also a function of the exogenous parameters.
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While realized price depends on on " and , it is a straightforward exercise to show that
when all risks are nite (i.e., do not grow with the economy) the risk premium is 0 as N
becomes large; this result is consistent with the conventional wisdom that nite risks vanish
when the number of investors becomes large.
However, when risk associated with the common factor grows with the economy,  (; )
is a function of " and . Specically, when 2F = N
2
f and N is large,  (
; ) reduces to
 (; ) =
 
 +  122f

   x
"("+)
2 +  122f
; (23)
here  (; ) is positive and depends on " and , both directly and indirectly through 
(because  solves  (; ) = 0, and  (; ) is a function of " and ). In Appendix B we
prove the following proposition.
Proposition 2. The assets risk premium is positive and depends on " and .
In Appendix B we prove the following two corollaries to Proposition 2.
Corollary 1. The  that satises  (; ) = 0 has the feature that:  increases as either
the quality of private information, , the precision of the supply of the risky asset available
for trade, x, or the fraction of informed investors in the economy, , increases; 
 decreases
as the quality of public information, ", increases; and 
 can either increase or decrease
as investors risk tolerance,  , per-capita risk associated with the common factor, 2f , or
factor-beta, , increases.
Corollary 2. An increase in " reduces the assets risk premium, whereas an increase in
 increases the risk premium.
Unlike the benchmark case considered in Section 2, Proposition 2 establishes that the
e¤ects of " and  on the risk premium in eqn. (23) are not additively separable from
the e¤ect of the common factor. Because " and  are not additively separable from the
common factor and risk associated with the common factor grows with the economy (i.e.,
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2F = N
2
f), " and  despite being nite will continue to a¤ect the risk premium as
N ! 1. As such, the risk premium is a function of both traditionalfeatures of the risk
premium (i.e.,  122f) and idiosyncratic features (i.e., " and ).
In our model the qualities of public and private information operate through " and ,
respectively. Increases in the quality of public information increase ", and increases in the
intermediarys private information increase . Thus, eqn. (23) establishes that the quality
of public and private information a¤ect the risk premium despite the economy having a
large number of investors. Eqn. (23) also establishes that " and  a¤ect the risk premium
incremental to the the risky assets covariance with the common factor, . This implies that
the qualities of public and private information should manifest in asset prices incremental to
factor-beta(s). Finally, because " and  are asset-specic characteristics, eqn. (23) implies
that the risk premium is a function of both factor-beta(s), , and asset- (or rm-) specic
characteristics.
As has been discussed, when each investor in the economy trades on his own account
as opposed to some fraction delegating their trades market competition will be perfect.
It is a straightforward exercise to show that in the comparable perfect competition setting
that results from a fraction  of informed investors trading on their own account, the risk
premium will be lower: in e¤ect, the risk premium will reduce to  122f , where 
 122f 
 (; ).10 In other words, when imperfect competition arises as a consequence of some
investors delegating their trades to an intermediary who has private information about ~",
the risky assets risk premium will be higher than in the comparable perfect-competition
setting. In Appendix B we prove the following additional corollary to Proposition 2.
Corollary 3. The assets risk premium will be higher than in a comparable setting where
competition among investors is perfect.
10 However, when  = 0, the risk premium reduces to  122f irrespective of delegation or self-direction:
see the discussion An implication of  = 0subsequent to the proof to Lemma 1 in Appendix C.
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4 Endogenous delegated trade
4.1 Discussion
In this section we extend the model in Section 3 to allow the following elements to be endoge-
nous: (i) the fraction of investors who delegate their trades; (ii) the number of intermediaries;
and (iii) the fee that intermediaries charge their clients. Our approach to introducing endo-
geneity is guided by the analysis in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) (hereafter GS). Specically,
GS posit an economy of atomistic investors, each of whom can choose to pay a xed fee and
acquire private information. GS show that in equilibrium each investor is indi¤erent between
paying the fee and being informed, versus not paying the fee and remaining uninformed, such
that (in equilibrium) there are no rents to acquiring private information. Rather than have
investors pay a fee to acquire private information, we assume that investors pay a fee to
delegate their trading decisions to a privately informed nancial intermediary, where the fee
is endogenously determined by competition among intermediaries.
The central premise of GS is that the cost of acquiring private information about a rm
(or risky asset more generally) is su¢ ciently small such that it is nancially viable for an
individual investor to bear the full cost of acquiring private information. Alternatively, one
could imagine that the cost is so large that no single, individual investor could possibly bear
the full cost of acquiring private information. Delegated trade allows the individual investor
to bear a fraction of the information acquisition cost, by paying a small fee to a privately
informed nancial intermediary. In return, the intermediary does not share his private
information with his clients, but rather trades on their behalf based on the information. In
this regard, the role of the intermediary in the economy is to acquire private information,
trade on behalf of his clients, and charge each client a very small fee. The collection of
small fees reimburses the intermediary for large information acquisition costs. This model of
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information acquisition, where costs are spread among a collection of very small investors,
o¤ers an alternative story about how information is gathered and disseminated in a large
economy.11
While our approach to allowing delegated trade to be endogenous is guided by GS, we
face three challenges in applying their analysis. First, in addition to considering rents from
investorsdecision to delegate versus self-direct, we also need to consider the potential rents
of the intermediaries to whom trade is delegated. For tractability, we assume intermediaries
are homogenous and each intermediary maximizes prots. Second, whereas GS assume
that markets are perfectly competitive, delegated trade results in imperfect competition and
modeling imperfect competition is inherently more challenging. Third, the objective of our
paper is to distinguish the e¤ect of di¤erent types of risks on the risk premium and this
more than anything else complicates our analysis.
As in GS, we focus on an economy with no rents. In an economy with no rents, there are
three conditions that hold (in equilibrium) that allow us to solve for the fraction of investors
who delegate their trades; the number of intermediaries; and the fee that intermediaries
charge their clients. (1) Intermediary prot maximization. We assume that each intermediary
earns fee revenue from his clients (per client fee  number of clients); pays a x setup cost
(e.g., cost of acquiring private information); and bears a variable cost for each additional
client (e.g., an administrative cost). (2) Intermediary zero prot condition. In equilibrium,
the number of intermediaries is such that each intermediary earns zero prots. If there were
prots (losses), additional intermediaries would enter (leave) the market, thereby invalidating
the equilibrium. In a frictionless market for delegation, intermediaries earn no rents. (3)
The investor indi¤erence condition. In equilibrium, there are no rents to investors from
11 In addition to having access to private information through an intermediary, one could imagine al-
ternative ways investors might become informed including gathering information on their own account.
Irrespective of the distribution of private information across investors, our results will be sustained provided
that some (positive) fraction of investors delegate their trades to an intermediary: this is the central message
of Section 3.
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delegation. Conditional on the delegation fee, each investor is indi¤erent between delegation
and self-direction. If this were not the case, there would be gains (losses) to delegation in
which case all investors would (not) delegate.
Finally, it is important to note that allowing various features of the equilibrium to be
endogenous does not alter the result that characteristics of the rms information environ-
ment (i.e., " and ) continue to manifest in the risk premium incremental to factor-beta(s).
Indeed, the expression for the risk premium given by eqn. (23) only changes insofar as the
equilibrium fraction of investors who delegate their trades, , is now endogenous and thus
depends on the characteristics of the economy.
4.2 Analysis
As a preliminary step toward characterizing an economy with no rents, let 
N
represent the
fee each intermediary charges to each of his clients, M the number of intermediaries, 0 an
individual intermediarys client base expressed as a fraction of the investors in the economy
(recall we assume intermediaries are identical), and 
 

N

the total fraction of investors in
the economy who choose to delegate their trades to an intermediary as a function of the
fee, such that investors are indi¤erent between delegating and self-directing their trades.
Note that 
 

N

N represents the total number of investors in the economy who choose to
delegate, whereas 0N denotes the number of clients of each intermediary. By virtue of
assuming all intermediaries are identical, 
 

N

= 0M . We o¤er the following result.
Lemma 1. In our characterization of an economy with delegated trade, for any fee of 
N
,
where  2

0; 
2

x
x+
("+)
2
1
22f

, there exists a fraction 
 

N

of investors in the economy
who delegate their trades that leaves all investors indi¤erent between delegating versus self-
directing their trades.
While Lemma 1 is ostensibly a straightforward result perhaps even obviousinsofar
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as its similarity to the comparable result in GS it is very challenging to prove: as such we
devote an entire appendix, Appendix C, to its proof. The additional complexity of proving
Lemma 1 arises from the fact that we posit an imperfect competition setting in conjunction
with distinguishing between two types of risks: risks that grow with the economy and risks
that do not. Lemma 1 establishes that if investors are charged a fee to delegate their trades,
then there exists a fraction of investors in the economy who delegate their trades that leaves
all investors indi¤erent between delegating versus self-directing their trades. E¤ectively, no
investor either those who delegate or those who self-direct earns any rents when the fee
for delegation is 
N
.
Now we turn our attention to the intermediaries. We assume an intermediary does not
trade, but instead gathers information about the risky asset and then coordinates the trades
of his clients. We assume that information gathering entails a xed cost K, and coordinating
trade for a fraction 0 of investors in the economy entails a variable cost 12k (0)
2. The latter
ensures that an intermediarys optimization problem as a function of 0 is concave (i.e.,
marginal prots decline as 0 increases), and thus its solution is unique and well dened.
Each intermediary conjectures that other intermediaries will charge each client a fee of
^
N
, where the caret (i.e., ^) implies a conjecture (as opposed to an equilibrium outcome).
Hence, the intermediary charges ^
N
: charging more than ^
N
will result in no clients, and
charging less than ^
N
will result in having as clients every investor who wants to delegate
(which is some fraction of investors greater than 

^
N

), and these many clients are too
many because the (variable) cost of coordinating clients is increasing at an increasing rate.12
While each clients fee, ^
N
, becomes asymptotically very small as the economy becomes large
(i.e., N !1), each intermediarys number of clients, 0N , becomes correspondingly large;
these have o¤setting e¤ects on an intermediarys revenue such that 0N  ^N = 0  ^ describes
12 This will always be the case in the equilibrium we posit in Proposition 3, where at least one person or
institution serves as an intermediary.
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his revenue. Thus, an intermediarys prot is given by:
0  ^  1
2
k (0)
2  K: (24)
Maximizing eqn. (24) with respect to 0 yields 0 =
^
k
, or ^ = k0. Assuming the zero-prot
condition and substituting this expression into eqn. (24) implies that an intermediarys prot
is given by
1
2
k20  K = 0:
Recall from Lemma 1 that if the fee is ^
N
then the total fraction of investors who will choose
to delegate their trades is 

^
N

, and because all intermediaries are identical 0 =


^
N

M
.
Thus, the equilibrium number of intermediaries must satisfy
1
2
k
0@

^
N

M
1A2  K = 0;
or M =
q
k
2K


^
N

.
As an aside, for there to be at least one person or institution willing to serve as an
intermediary, it must be the case that M  1, which, in turn, requires 

^
N


q
2K
k
.
Additionally, 

^
N

cannot exceed 1. Thus, in conjunction with assuming 

^
N


q
2K
k
we are also required to assume k  2K.
Finally, recall that ^ = k0, and thus for the conjectured fee to be an equilibrium outcome
it must be the case that
^ = k0 = k


^
N

M
=
p
2kK:
This implies the following result, the proof of which should be clear from Lemma 1 and the
discussion above.
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Proposition 3. The following elements constitute an equilibrium in an economy where no
intermediary or investor earns any rents and the fraction of investors who delegate their
trades, the number of intermediaries, and the fee that intermediaries charge their clients are
all endogenous. The total fraction of investors in the economy who delegate their trades to
an intermediary is 
p
2kK
N

; there are M =
q
k
2K

p
2kK
N

intermediaries in the economy;
intermediaries charge each client a fee of
p
2kK
N
; where we require 
p
2kK
N


q
2K
k
(and
thus, in e¤ect, k  2K) to ensure the existence of at least one intermediary, and
p
2kK <

2

x
x + 
(" + )
2
1
22f
to ensure that their exists a fraction 
p
2kK
N

of investors in the economy who are indi¤erent
between delegating and self-directing their trades.
4.3 Numerical comparative statics
In this section we illustrate graphically the e¤ects of changes in the quality of public infor-
mation ("), the quality of private information (), systematic cash ow volatility (f), and
the numerator of the delegation fee () on: the fraction of investors who choose to delegate
their trades (); the level of market illiquidity (); and the risky assets risk premium ().13
To facilitate the analysis, henceforth (and without loss of generality) we x the remaining
exogenous parameters at 1: that is, we assume  =  = x = 1.14 In our illustrations, 
solves for 
 (; ; ;  ; f ; "; ; x) + 2


= 0, where 
 (; ) is as dened in eqn. (36) in
Appendix C;  solves for  (; ) = 0, where  (; ) is as dened in the Proof to Proposition
13 From Proposition 3,  must satisfy the requirement that  =
p
2kK; nonethless, k and K can be
selected arbitrarily such that, for all intents and purposes,  can be treated as an exogenous parameter,
subject to the requirement in Lemma 1 that  falls within an appropriate range to guarantee the existence
of an equilibrium .
14 In our model the distinciton between  and f is arbitrary, and so identical results hold if f = 1 and
 is allowed to vary.
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2 in Appendix B; and  (; ) is as dened in eqn. (23) in Section 3.
We generate three sets of graphs, Figures 1, 2, and 3, where each gure contains three
panels: Panel A graphs , Panel B graphs , and Panel C graphs . Figure 1 examines
the interaction of public and private information on , , and , when " 2 (0; 1] and
 2 (0; 1] (setting f = 1 and  = 0:03). [INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE.] Figure 2 examines
the interaction of public information and systematic cash ow volatility on , , and ,
when " 2 (0; 1] and f 2 (0; 1] (setting  = 1 and  = 0:03). [INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE.]
Figure 3 examines the interaction of public information and the delegation fee on , , and
, when " 2 (0; 1] and  2 (0; 0:20] (setting f = 1 and  = 1). [INSERT FIGURE
3 HERE.] Collectively, Figures 1-3 document that the fraction of investors who choose to
delegate their trades (), the level of illiquidity (), and the risky assets risk premium (),
all decrease as the quality of public information (") increases.
Another interesting relation is the one between the cost of delegation and price informa-
tiveness: the e¢ ciency with which price communicates intermediariesprivate information
to uninformed investors. As in GS, price in our analysis does not perfectly communicate
intermediariesprivate information; otherwise, there would be no incentive to delegate trade.
One straightforward metric to measure price informativeness is the precision of the infor-
mation uninformed investors glean by conditioning their beliefs on price, : see eqn. (11).
An increase in the delegation fee has two countervailing e¤ects on . First, an increase
in the fee results in a decrease in the fraction of investors who delegate their trades (i.e.,
decreases ); this works to reduce the informativeness of price because a smaller fraction of
investors in the economy is informed. Second, an increase in the fee results in a decrease in
illiquidity (i.e., decreases ) because fewer investors are informed; this works to increase the
informativeness of price. Consequently, whether an increase in the delegation fee is associ-
ated with an increase or a decrease in the informativeness of price depends on whether the
-e¤ect versus the -e¤ect dominates. In Figure 4 we graphically illustrate the e¤ect of the
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delegation fee () on price informativeness () for the same numerical values used earlier
(i.e.,  2 (0; 0:20] and all remaining exogenous parameters set to 1). [INSERT FIGURE 4
HERE.] Figure 4 shows that price informativeness decreases as the delegation fee increases.
5 Capital market where the common factor is tradable
It is common practice in the noisy rational expectations literature to consider an economy
with a single risky asset and a risk-free bond. (e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Kyle,
1989; Admati and Peiderer, 1990). This is not to suggest the insights from such models
do not apply to economies populated by multiple risky assets (e.g., Admati, 1985). Rather,
the complexity associated with including multiple risky assets in a model of strategic trade
is so great, and the additional insight so small, that it is common practice to model price
formation and strategic trade for a single risky asset. In our context, the focus on a single
risky asset considerably facilitates the discussion.
Nonetheless, to provide insight on this issue without burdening the model with unnec-
essary complexity, in this section we consider the case where (as in Section 3) an exogenous
fraction  of investors delegate their trades in a risky asset, but can also trade a noisy mea-
sure of the common factor. For example, in our model ~F represents the true common factor;
as such, one can think of ~F as a macroeconomic state variable that determines future invest-
ment opportunities. The true common factor, however, is not necessarily a traded security
(Merton, 1973). We capture this phenomenon by allowing for the possibility that the true
common factor can only be traded with noise. Here we show that our results depend on
whether investors can decompose and price separately the risk associated with the system-
atic and the idiosyncratic components of the risky assets cash ow, and not the number of
tradeable securities in the economy.
In principle, diversifying into the common factor allows investors to decompose the risks
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associated with the systematic and the idiosyncratic components of the risky assets cash
ow. For example, if the traded common factor tracks the true common factor without noise,
investors can separate out the idiosyncratic component of the risky assets cash ow, ~", by
going long shares of the risky asset and short  times the common factor. The variance of
the payo¤s to this portfolio will simply be 2", the variance of the idiosyncratic cash ow.
Because investors can isolate these two components, only risk associated with the systematic
component will be priced.15 While this may seem the end of the story, it comes with an
important caveat. If investors can only trade a noisy measure of the true common factor,
investors will be unable to perfectly decompose cash ow (i.e., the variance of payo¤s to the
aforementioned portfolio is not 2"). In this circumstance, our results hold.
We illustrate this by rst showing that if the traded common factor tracks the true
common factor without noise, investors can use the traded factor to perfectly decompose the
systematic and idiosyncratic components, such that only risk associated with the systematic
component of cash ow a¤ects the risk premium. Alternatively, we show that if investors can
only trade a noisy measure of the true common factor, investors will be unable to perfectly
decompose the risky assets systematic and idiosyncratic components, such that the risk
premium will depend on " and . Because the analysis in this section is qualitatively
identical to the analysis in Section 3, we conne most of it to Appendix D.
Recall that we represent the risky assets cash ow by ~Va = a +  ~F + ~", where ~F has
a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 2F = N
2
f and ~" has a normal distribution
with mean 0 and precision ". We represent the cash ow to the traded common factor, ~VT ,
by ~VT = ~F + ~T , where ~T represents investorsuncertain assessment of the expected cash
ow: ~T is an independent random variable with a normal distribution with mean  and
15 This result is not surprising. If cash ows are assumed to follow a factor structure and the true common
factor is traded without noise, then by assumption (in a large economy with rational investors) only the true
common factor and investorsrisk-aversion will determine asset prices. Indjejikian (2007) makes a similar
point in the context of Lambert et al. (2007).
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variance 2T , where 
2
T = N
2
. As there is no private information about the common factor,
we assume that all investors act as price takers in their demands for the traded common
factor. As in Section 3, uninformed investors act as price takers in their demands for the
risky asset, whereas an intermediary trades in behalf of informed investors. In Appendix D
we prove the following proposition.
Proposition 4. In the absence of noise in the traded common factor, the risky assets risk
premium is independent of " and . Alternatively, in the presence of noise in the traded
factor, the risky assets risk premium is positive and a function of " and .
Proposition 4 provides our main result for a setting where investors can trade both the risky
asset and the common factor. In the absence of noise in the traded factor, investors can
use the common factor to perfectly decompose the risky assets systematic and idiosyncratic
components such that as the economy becomes large only the former is priced. In the
presence of noise in the traded factor, however, this is not the case. Here, the risk premium
will be positive and a function of 2f , 
2
, " and . This result points to the fact that
considerations of whether our analysis extends more generally should be based on the ability
of the market to decompose and separately price risks not on the number of assets that
are incorporated into the economy.16
Given that our results are predicated on the notion that investors can only trade a noisy
measure of the true common factor, it is instructive to consider how our results comport with
the perception that the observable market portfolio is the true common factor; a perception
premised on intuition from the CAPM. In this regard, we make two points. First, Roll (1977)
points out that the theoretical market portfolio implied by the CAPM is in practice not
observable or tradable: it includes an innite number of securities, including those related to
16 The benchmark model discussed in Section 2, which is otherwise identical to our main model in Section
3, makes clear that our results do not attain when all trade is self-directed. This serves to emphasize that
our results are driven by delegation, and not some other feature of the economy, such as the number of assets
available for trade.
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private companies. Second, because all investors in the CAPM are homogenous, it is optimal
for all investors to hold the same portfolio (the market portfolio), hence all securities are
priced relative to that portfolio. In contrast, in models of heterogeneous information, each
investors optimal portfolio depends on his information set. Consequently, not all investors
hold the market portfolio, and thus it is not feasible to price securities exclusively in terms of
the market portfolio (e.g., Biais et al., 2010). For these reasons, we caution against trying to
extend economic intuition based on a model of homogenous beliefs (the CAPM) to a model
of heterogeneous beliefs, and caution against interpreting the common factors frequently
used in empirical asset pricing tests (e.g., the CRSP market portfolio and the Fama-French
factors) as noiseless measures of the true common factors.
6 Empirical Implications
Our primary results suggest that delegated trade inhibits a large economy from becoming
perfectly competitive, and, as a consequence, characteristics of the rms information envi-
ronment manifest in asset prices incremental to the rms factor-beta despite the economy
being large. For example, unlike the traditional expression for the risk premium in a large
economy (which depends exclusively on investorsrisk tolerance, the rms factor-beta, and
systematic cash ow volatility: see Section 2.1), the expression for the risk premium in our
model also includes rm characteristics related to the information environment (notably "
and : see Section 3.5). This result has several implications for empirical work examining
the relation between the information environment and expected returns.
First, to the extent that a particular rm characteristic a¤ects the quality of public in-
formation, the quality of private information, or the rms idiosyncratic cash ow volatility,
our analysis suggests this characteristic will be priced incremental to the rms factor-beta.
In this regard, our results suggest a host of rm characteristics that could potentially a¤ect
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expected returns incremental to factor-betas. Thus, while we interpret some of the predic-
tions of the model primarily from the perspective of accounting information, the predictions
can be thought of as applying more broadly to any source of public or private information
and/or idiosyncratic cash ow volatility.
Second, because risks manifest in the form of both rm characteristics and factor-betas,
our analysis suggests factor-based asset pricing tests cannot rule out that a particular risk
is priced only that it is priced in the form of a common risk factor. This is particularly
relevant for the ongoing (empirical) debate about the pricing of accounting information.17
While much of the empirical literature focuses on testing whether the quality of accounting
information represents a separate common risk factor, our results suggest that the focus on
a separate, accounting quality risk factor is too limiting. In particular, our results suggest
that the quality of a rms accounting information can a¤ect expected returns as an indi-
vidual rm-level characteristic (e.g., through ") even if accounting quality is not priced as
a separate common factor. Thus, our model suggests that a rms accounting quality can
be priced as an additional risk, even if the factor-beta on an accounting quality risk factor
is not priced (e.g., Core et al., 2008).
One avenue for future empirical research on this topic might be to explore whether ac-
counting quality is priced as a rm characteristic (as our results would suggest) or as a
separate common risk factor (as suggested by Kim and Qi, 2010; Ogneva, 2012). Prior
work in nance has explored a similar question as it relates to whether size, book-to-market,
and accruals are priced as systematic risk factors or as rm characteristics (e.g., Daniel and
Titman, 1997; Davis et al., 2000; Hirshleifer et al., 2012).18 If accounting quality is priced
17 See Francis et al. (2005), Core et al. (2008), Kim and Qi (2010), and Ogneva (2012). For a review see
Shevlin (2013).
18 Studies in this literature run an empirical horse-race between the predictive abilities of factor-betas
versus rm characteristics for a cross-section of returns. For example, within the context of the debate over
whether size and book-to-market are priced as factors or as characteristics, prior work regresses expected
returns on estimates of the rms factor-betas with respect to the Fama-French market, size, and book-to-
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empirically as a separate common risk factor, then not only should the accounting qual-
ity factor-beta be related to expected returns, but it should be related to expected returns
incremental to the accounting quality characteristic. In contrast, if accounting quality is
priced empirically as a rm characteristic, then the rm-level accounting quality character-
istic should be related to expected returns, and should subsume the explanatory power of
accounting quality factor-beta.
Third, much of the existing literature examines the on average relation between the
quality of public information, illiquidity, and expected returns either across countries or
across rms (within a given country). While our results suggest this relation is positive, the
results also suggest considerable cross-sectional variation in the e¤ect of public information.
For example, our numerical analysis illustrates various cross-partialsregarding the e¤ect
of public information (") on illiquidity () and the risk premium (). Figure 1 illustrates
how the e¤ect of public information varies with private information, Figure 2 illustrates how
the e¤ect of public information varies with the level of systematic cash ow volatility, and
Figure 3 illustrates how the e¤ect of public information varies with the costs borne by the
intermediary through the delegation fee he charges. Perhaps, most notably, Figure 2 shows
that the e¤ect of public information on the risk premium vanishes as systematic cash ow
volatility approaches zero. Thus, while some studies have examined whether the pricing of
public information varies with market competition (e.g., Armstrong et al., 2011; Akins et
al., 2012; Bhattacharya et al., 2012), our results suggests additional variation in the pricing
of public information. Empirical researchers can potentially use these theoretical results to
develop more powerful tests of the empirical relation among public information, illiquidity,
and expected returns.19
market factors (^
MKTRF
, ^
SMB
, and ^
HML
, respectively), and additionally includes measures of the rms
size and book-to-market ratio in the regression. Studies in this literature generally nd that the coe¢ cients
on rm size and book-to-market are signicantly di¤erent from zero, and the coe¢ cients on the estimated
Fama-French factor-betas are insignicantly di¤erent from zero.
19 For example, Lang et al. (2012) examine the relation between rm-level measures of transparency and
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Finally, we hasten to add three caveats that future empirical tests will need to confront
in order to draw valid inferences.
(1) Construct validity. Our predictions are premised on the notion that the empirical
researcher has a valid empirical measure of the theoretical construct of interest. In this
regard, our predictions are stated explicitly in terms of constructs of interest rather than
common empirical measures of these constructs. For example, we state our predictions in
terms of accounting qualityas a construct. Our model is one of information economics and
not measurement the accounting process itself is outside the scope of our model. Conse-
quently, the model does not speak to how one determines the bestempirical measure of an
accounting-quality construct. Empirical measurement choices require researchers to make
tradeo¤s not considered in this paper (e.g., bias, measurement error, etc.). In this regard,
any empirical tests of our model are necessarily joint tests of our theoretical predictions
and the presumption that a specic empirical proxy measures the theoretical construct of
interest (Zimmerman, 2013).
(2) Disentangling the e¤ect of real volatility of cash ows from the e¤ect of public infor-
mation. Recall from Section 2 that " represents investorsassessment of idiosyncratic cash
ow volatility, which is driven by the sum of two (idiosyncratic) forces: the real volatility of
cash ow and common knowledge about that cash ow. This implies that either a reduction
in real volatility or an increase in the quality of public information about volatility works to
increase ". To the extent that an empirical researcher wants to make specic statements
about the quality of public information, separate and apart from the real volatility of cash
ow, it is important that the researcher employs a design that cleanly distinguishes between
illiquidity across 46 countries, distinguishing between periods when the volatility of a countrys stock market
is high versus low. Lang et al. (2012) nd the e¤ect of transparency on illiquidity is most pronounced in
periods when the volatility of the countrys stock market is high. Viewing rm transparency as a measure of
the quality of public information (") and volatility of a countrys stock market as systematic volatility (f ),
the results are consistent with the notion that the e¤ect of public information on illiquidity () is largest
when systematic volatility is high (e.g., Figure 2, Panel B).
32
the two. For example, consider a circumstance where a researcher employs an empirical mea-
sure of accounting quality that commingles volatility of cash ow and the quality of public
information. This is not an issue for testing the predictions of our model, per se, because in
our model both of these constructs a¤ect illiquidity () and the risk premium () identically:
irrespective of whether the measure reects the volatility of cash ow or quality of public
information, the predictions would be the same. However, the inferences that one can draw
from such an empirical design are limited. If the empirical design commingles volatility of
cash ow and quality of public information, inferences cannot be unambiguously attributed
to the e¤ect of information (as distinct form the e¤ect of cash ow volatility).
(3) Endogeneity. While we predict that delegated trade makes markets imperfect, giving
rise to the relations we document, delegated trade, illiquidity, and expected returns are
endogenous. This confounds the interpretation of empirical tests that relate measures of
delegated trade to illiquidity and expected returns. For example, the equilibrium level of
delegated trade is itself a function of the information environment (which is exogenous).
Panel A in each of Figures 1 through 3 graphically illustrates how the level of delegated trade
varies with the qualities of public and private information, systematic cash ow volatility,
and the information acquisition costs borne by the intermediary through the delegation fee
he charges. Thus, in addition to informing future empirical work on the relation between
the information environment and expected returns, our results can also potentially inform
future empirical work on the relation between the information environment and the extent
to which individual investors delegate their trades.
7 Conclusion
We extend a standard, rational expectations model of trade to incorporate the possibility that
individual investors can delegate their trades to a privately informed nancial intermediary:
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for example, an institutional investor. We motivate this modeling approach by appealing to
the notion that the cost of acquiring private information (not already impounded in prices)
is so large that it is not feasible for an individual investor to bear the entirety of this cost.
Instead, the role of an intermediary is to acquire private information, trade on behalf of his
clients, and charge each individual client a very small fee as compensation for his services.
The collection of small fees reimburses the intermediary for large information acquisition
costs, and allows the costs of information acquisition to be spread across multiple investors.
It is easy to imagine a circumstance where the risk premium is characterized exclusively
in terms of factor-betas (e.g., the CAPM). However, given the mounting empirical evidence
that rm characteristics a¤ect asset prices, the purpose of this paper is to identify and
examine a circumstance in which characteristics of the rms information environment are
priced incremental to factor-betas despite the economy being large. Specically, we show
that the risk premium is a function of a rms exposure to a common risk factor and three
idiosyncratic rm characteristics: (i) the quality of public information; (ii) the quality of
private information; and (iii) the rms idiosyncratic cash ow volatility.
Large economies typically imply that markets are perfectly competitive and, for this
reason, characteristics of the rms information environment are not thought to a¤ect a rms
risk premium incremental to common risk factors. However, the presence of an intermediary
implies that imperfect competition is sustained despite the fact that the economy is large.
As the number of investors in the economy becomes large, an intermediarys client base
grows in tandem. Thus, even though the impact of any single investors demand on price
declines as the economy grows, an intermediarys e¤ect on price is sustained. The ongoing
presence of this market imperfection prevents the large economy from becoming perfectly
competitive, and ensures that characteristics of the rms information environment continue
to manifest in the risk premium.
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Figure 1. Effect of Public and Private Information 
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Panel A plots the relation among delegated trade (?), public information (??), and 
private information (??). Panel B plots the relation among illiquidity (?), public 
information (??), and private information (??).  Panel C plots the relation among the 
risk premium (?), public information (??), and private information (??).  In each panel, 
the y-axis is increasing bottom-to-top, and the x- and z-axes are increasing right-to-left. 
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Figure 2. Effect of Public Information and Systematic Cash Flow Volatility 
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Panel A plots the relation among delegated trade (?), public information (??), and 
systematic cash flow volatility (?f). Panel B plots the relation among illiquidity (?), 
public information (??), and systematic cash flow volatility (?f).  Panel C plots the 
relation among the risk premium (?), public information (??), and systematic cash flow 
volatility (?f). In Panel A the y-axis is increasing bottom-to-top, the x-axis is increasing 
left-to-right, and the z-axis is increasing right-to-left. In Panels B and C the y-axis is 
increasing bottom-to-top, and the x- and z-axes are increasing right-to-left. 
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Figure 3. Effect of Public Information and Numerator of the Delegation Fee 
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Panel A plots the relation among delegated trade (?), public information (??), and the 
numerator of the delegation fee (?). Panel B plots the relation among illiquidity (?), 
public information (??), and the numerator of the delegation fee (?).  Panel C plots the 
relation among the risk premium (?), public information (??), and the numerator of the 
delegation fee (?). In each panel, the y-axis is increasing bottom-to-top, and the x- and 
z-axes are increasing right-to-left. 
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Figure 4. Delegation Fee and Price Informativeness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This figures plots the relation between the numerator of the delegation fee (?) and the 
equilibrium level of price informativeness (??). 
 
0.000 
0.002 
0.004 
0.006 
0.008 
0.010 
0.012 
0.014 
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.20 
Pr
ic
e 
In
fo
rm
at
iv
en
es
s (
? ?)
 
Num. Del. Fee (?)
Appendix A - Notation of Key Parameters
N - The number of investors in the economy
τ - An investor’s tolerance for risk
P˜a - The price of shares of the risky asset
V˜a - The risky asset’s cash flow
μa - The risky asset’s expected cash flow
β - The risky asset’s factor-beta
F˜ - The common factor, where F˜ has variance σ2F = Nσ
2
f
ε˜ - The idiosyncratic component of the risky asset’s cash flow, where ε˜ has variance σ2ε
α - The fraction of investors who delegate their investment decisions to an intermediary
πε + πξ - The (total) precision of the intermediary’s information
πξ - The precision of the intermediary’s private information
DIa, DUa - Informed and uninformed investors’ demands for the risky asset, respectively
λ - The extent to which total informed demand, αNDIa, aﬀects price, P˜a
x˜ - The supply of shares of the risky asset, where x˜ has variance πx
q˜ - The information an uninformed investor infers from price
πε + πδ - The (total) precision of the uninformed investor’s information
πδ - The precision of the information an uninformed investor infers from price
Δ (λ, ·) - The risky asset’s risk premium
φ
N
- The fee an investor pays to become informed
M - The number of intermediaries in the economy
k, K - An intermediary’s variable and fixed costs, respectively
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Appendix B - Results related to Section 3
In the proofs that follow, let πF and πf represent the reciprocals of σ2F and σ
2
f , respectively:
as such, πF and πf represent the precisions (i.e., the reciprocal of variance) of each respective
variable. We report and prove our results exclusively in terms of precision.
Proof to Proposition 1. To determine Λ (λ, ·), we substitute in the expression for πδ in
eqn. (11) into eqn. (20) and then solve for λ. Ignoring proportionality factors, this yields
the following expression for Λ (λ, ·): Λ (λ, ·) = c3λ3 + c2λ2 − c1λ− c0, where the coeﬃcients
cj are defined by
c3 = (NτπF )
3
πε (πε + πξ)
2
α2 (1− α) ,
c2 = (NτπF )
2 (πε + πξ)α

πε (2− 3α)

πF + β
2 (πε + πξ)

− απFπξ

,
c1 = NτπF ((NτπF )
2
πξ (πε + πξ) πxα
2 (1− α)
+

πF + β
2 (πε + πξ)
 
πε (3α− 1)

πF + β
2 (πε + πξ)

+ 2απFπξ

),
c0 =

πF + β
2 (πε + πξ)

× πF + β2πε
 
πF + β
2 (πε + πξ)

+ (NτπF )
2
απξπx

.
Note that c3 and c0 are both positive, but the signs of c2 and c1 are indeterminate. Because
c3 and c0 are both positive, there exists some λ > 0 that solves Λ (λ, ·) = 0. For Λ (λ, ·) = 0
to have multiple, positive λ-roots, Descartes’ rule of signs requires that c2 and c1 both be
negative (when c3 and c0 are both positive). A necessary and suﬃcient condition that c2 is
negative is that α >
2πε(πF+β2(πε+πξ))
3πε(πF+β2(πε+πξ))+πF πξ
, and a necessary (but not suﬃcient) condition
that c1 is negative is that α <
πε(πF+β2(πε+πξ))
3πε(πF+β2(πε+πξ))+2πF πξ
. But there is no α that satisfies
both necessary conditions, and so c2 and c1 cannot both be negative: this establishes the
existence of a unique λ > 0 that satisfies Λ (λ, ·) = 0. Let λ∗ represent the equilibrium λ:
that is, Λ (λ∗, ·) = 0. In addition, let d
dλΛ (λ
∗, ·) represent the derivative of Λ (λ, ·) evaluated
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at λ∗: that is, d
dλΛ (λ
∗, ·) = d
dλΛ (λ, ·) |λ=λ∗ . In the proofs that follow, it will be useful to
establish two features of the equilibrium. The first is that d
dλΛ (λ
∗, ·) > 0. To establish this
feature, note that c2 and c1 cannot both be negative. Thus, suppose c2 is positive. Then
d
dλΛ (λ
∗, ·) = d
dλΛ (λ
∗, ·)− Λ(λ∗,·)λ∗ = 2c3 (λ∗)2+ c2λ∗+ (λ∗)−1 c0 > 0 where the second equality
results from the fact that Λ (λ∗, ·) = 0 in equilibrium. Alternatively, suppose c1 is positive.
Then d
dλΛ (λ
∗, ·) = d
dλΛ (λ
∗, ·)−2Λ(λ∗,·)λ∗ = c3 (λ∗)2+c1λ∗+2 (λ∗)−1 c0 > 0. The second feature
is that because Λ (λ = 0, ·) < 0 and d
dλΛ (λ
∗, ·) > 0, any λˆ, say, that yields Λ

λˆ, ·

< 0 must
have the property that λˆ ∈ [0,λ∗) and thus λˆ < λ∗. In eﬀect, Λ (λ, ·) starts out negative
at λ = 0, and crosses the x-axis only once at λ∗ — only once because d
dλΛ (λ
∗, ·) > 0. For
example, to cross the x-axis more than once would require some additional λ∗∗, say, such
that Λ (λ∗∗, ·) = 0 and d
dλΛ (λ
∗∗, ·) < 0, and this can never be the case. Thus, any λˆ that
yields Λ

λˆ, ·

< 0 has the property that λˆ < λ∗. Q.E.D.
Proof to Proposition 2. First, determine Λ (λ, ·) when π−1F = Nπ−1f as N becomes large.
To do this, substitute in the expression for πδ in eqn. (11) into eqn. (20) and then solve for
λ as N becomes large. Unlike the expression for Λ (λ, ·) in Proposition 1, however, here we
do not ignore proportionality factors because these factors are a function of N . This yields
Λ (λ, ·) = c3λ3 + c2λ2 − c1λ− c0, where the coeﬃcients cj are defined by
c3 = α
2 (1− α) πε (πε + πξ) (τπf )3 ,
c2 = α (2− 3α) πε (πε + πξ) (τβπf )2 ,
c1 = ((1− α) πξπx (ατπf )2 + (3α− 1) πε (πε + πξ) β4)τπf ,
c0 = β
2

πε (πε + πξ) β
4 + α (τπf )
2
πξπx

.
Next determine Δ (λ, ·) when π−1F = Nπ−1f as N becomes large: this yields eqn. (23). To
establish that the risk premium is positive, note that Δ (λ, ·) has two features. First, Δ (λ, ·)
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increases as λ increases. Second, Δ (λ, ·) has a unique, positive λ-root: call this root λˆ.
Using the expression for Λ (λ, ·) above, one can show that Λ

λˆ, ·

< 0, which implies λˆ < λ∗
from the Proof to Proposition 1. Hence, Δ (λ∗, ·) > 0 because Δ (λ, ·) is increasing in λ.
Q.E.D.
Proof to Corollary 1. Recall two facts from the Proof to Proposition 1. First, in equi-
librium Λ (λ∗, ·) = 0; second, d
dλΛ (λ
∗, ·) > 0. Thus, using the expression for Λ (λ, ·) in the
Proof to Proposition 2, one can show:
d
dπξ
λ
∗ = −
d
dπξ
Λ (λ∗, ·)− Λ(λ∗,·)πε+πξ
d
dλΛ (λ
∗, ·) = ατ
2π2fπx
πε
πε + πξ
ατ (1− α) πfλ∗ + β2
d
dλΛ (λ
∗, ·) > 0;
d
dπx
λ
∗ = −
d
dπx
Λ (λ∗, ·)
d
dλΛ (λ
∗, ·) = ατ
2π2fπξ
ατ (1− α) πfλ∗ + β2
d
dλΛ (λ
∗, ·) > 0;
d
dπε
λ
∗ = −
d
dπε
Λ (λ∗, ·)− 2πε+πξ
πε(πε+πξ)
Λ (λ∗, ·)
d
dλΛ (λ
∗, ·) = −ατ
2π2fπxπξ
2πε + πξ
πε (πε + πξ)
ατ (1− α) πfλ∗ + β2
d
dλΛ (λ
∗, ·) < 0.
The proof that establishes that the sign of d
dαλ
∗ is positive is complex. The steps are as
follows. First, define
L (λ∗, ·) = −dΛ (λ
∗, ·)
dα
+
1
α
ατπf (2− 3α)λ+ β2
ατπf (1− α)λ+ β2
Λ (λ∗, ·) .
Second, show: 1) that the denominator of L (λ, ·) is always positive; and 2) the numerator
is positive when λ = β
2
(1−α)τπf and increasing in λ. Third, show that Λ

β2
(1−α)τπf , ·

< 0,
which implies β
2
(1−α)τπf < λ
∗ from the Proof to Proposition 1; thus, the numerator of L (λ, ·)
evaluated at λ = λ∗ is positive and hence L (λ∗, ·) is positive. Finally, because in equilibrium
Λ (λ∗, ·) = 0,
d
dα
λ
∗ =
− d
dαΛ (λ
∗, ·)
d
dλΛ (λ
∗, ·) =
L (λ∗, ·)
d
dλΛ (λ
∗, ·) > 0.
This proves that λ∗ increases as α increases. As for the fact that λ∗ can either increase or
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decrease as τ , πf (where πf = σ−2f ), or β increases, each of these parameters operates on
Λ (λ, ·) (as defined in the Proof to Proposition 2) in an equivalent way. For example, if one
defines a parameter s = τβ−2πf , then Λ ( λ, ·) reduces to an expression that is exclusively
a function of s. Thus, it suﬃces to prove this claim for one of τ , πf , or β: we prove it for
τ . First, let ω1 =

10, 1, 1, 1, 215.38, 1
10
, 1

and ω2 =

1, 1, 1, 1, 127.69, 2
3
, 1

; one can show
that Λ (10,ω1) = 0 and Λ (10,ω2) = 0. Next, show that
d
dτ
Λ (λ, ·) |λ=10,ω1 = −152.02 and
d
dτ
Λ (λ, ·) |λ=10,ω2 = 131.2.
Thus, the sign of d
dτ λ
∗ = −
d
dτ Λ(λ
∗,·)
d
dλΛ(λ
∗,·) can be either positive or negative. Q.E.D.
Proof to Corollary 2. We prove this for the eﬀect of a change in πε on the risk premium:
the proof for πξ is identical in spirit. The eﬀect of a change in πε on Δ (λ
∗, ·) is:
d
dπε
Δ (λ∗, ·) + d
dλ
Δ (λ∗, ·) d
dπε
λ
∗
=
d
dπε
Δ (λ∗, ·) d
dλΛ (λ
∗, ·) + d
dλΔ (λ
∗, ·)
	
−ατ 2π2fπxπξ
2πε+πξ
πε(πε+πξ)

ατ (1− α) πfλ∗ + β2


d
dλΛ (λ
∗, ·) ,(25)
where in eqn. (25).we substitute in the expression for d
dπε
λ
∗ from Corollary 1. From the
Proof to Proposition 1 d
dλΛ (λ
∗, ·) > 0, and thus the denominator of the expression in eqn.
(25) is positive. Let Φ (λ∗, ·) represent the numerator of the expression (ignoring positive
proportional terms). Then, recalling that Λ (λ∗, ·) = 0, one can show that the numerator
reduces to
Φ (λ∗, ·)−
⎛
⎝4τα (1− α)λ+
β2
πf
(3− α)
π2f

τα (1− α) πfλ+ β2

⎞
⎠Λ (λ∗, ·) = −αβ
4
πε (πε + πξ)

2ταπfλ+ β
2
2
π3f

τα (1− α) πfλ+ β2
 ,
(26)
where the right-hand-side of eqn. (26) is clearly negative. This proves the claim. Q.E.D.
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Proof to Corollary 3. To showΔ (λ∗, ·) ≥ (τπf )−1 β2, define a functionG (λ, τ , πε, πξ, πf , πx,α, β) =
Δ (λ, ·)− (τπf )−1 β2, where Δ (λ, ·) is defined as in eqn. (23). The function G (λ, ·) has two
features. It increases as λ increases, and it has a unique, positive λ-root: call this root λˆ. It
is a tedious, but otherwise straightforward, exercise to show that Λ

λˆ, ·

< 0, where Λ (λ, ·)
is as defined in the Proof to Proposition 2. Because Λ

λˆ, ·

< 0, from the Proof to Propo-
sition 1 it must be the case that the λˆ < λ∗. But this, in turn, implies that G (λ∗, ·) > 0
because G (λ, ·) increases as λ increases, and hence Δ (λ∗, ·) ≥ (τπf )−1 β2. Q.E.D.
Appendix C - Results related to Section 4
Proof to Lemma 1. Lemma 1 is very complex in detail, and so we attempt to reduce it
to a series of smaller steps. In the first step, we determine the expected utilities of informed
and uninformed investors. In the economy we posit, there are two (independent) random
elements, or variables: y˜, informed investors’ private information, and x˜, random supply.
The former has mean 0 and precision πy =

π−1ε + π
−1
ξ
−1
, and the latter has mean 1 and
precision πx. To start, an informed investor’s ex ante expected utility is
−Ey˜,x˜

E

exp

−1
τ
DIa

V˜a − Pa

|y, x

. (27)
Substituting in the expressions for DIa in eqn. (7) and Pa in eqn. (4) and simplifying allows
eqn. (27) to be characterized as
−Ey˜,x˜

E

exp

−1
τ
DIa

V˜a − Pa

|y, x

= −Ey˜,x˜

exp

−1
2
(aI y˜ + bI x˜+ cI)
2

, (28)
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where
aI =
πξ
πε+πξ
√
N
)
β
2
σ2f +N
−1 (πε + πξ)
−1 + 2αλτ
,
bI =
λ
√
N
)
β
2
σ2f +N
−1 (πε + πξ)
−1 + 2αλτ
,
cI = −
θ
√
N
)
β
2
σ2f +N
−1 (πε + πξ)
−1 + 2αλτ
.
Next determine the expression for an informed investor’s expected utility that results from
integrating over y˜ and x˜ in eqn. (28). Here the 4 key steps are:
−Ey˜,x˜

exp

−1
2
(aI y˜ + bI x˜+ cI)
2

(29)
= −
√
πyπx
2π
&
y
&
x
exp[−1
2
(aIy + bIx+ cI)
2
−1
2
	
y, x− 1


⎛
⎜⎝
πy 0
0 πx
⎞
⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎝
y
x− 1
⎞
⎟⎠]dxdy (30)
= −
√
πyπx
2π
&
y
&
x
exp[− (bI + cI) (aIy + bIx)−
1
2

c2I − b2I

−1
2
	
y, x− 1


⎛
⎜⎝
πy + a
2
I aIbI
aIbI πx + b
2
I
⎞
⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎝
y
x− 1
⎞
⎟⎠]dxdy (31)
= −
-,,,,,+
πyπx
⎛
⎜⎝
πy + a
2
I aIbI
aIbI πx + b
2
I
⎞
⎟⎠

exp[− (bI + cI) bI −
1
2

c2I − b2I

+
1
2
(bI + cI)
2
	
aI , bI


⎛
⎜⎝
πy + a
2
I aIbI
aIbI πx + b
2
I
⎞
⎟⎠
−1⎛
⎜⎝
aI
bI
⎞
⎟⎠] (32)
= −
*
πyπx
πxa2I + πyb
2
I + πxπy
exp

−1
2
πxπy (bI + cI)
2
πxa2I + πyb
2
I + πxπy

. (33)
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Next, an uninformed investor’s ex ante expected utility is
−Ey˜,x˜

E

exp

−1
τ
DUa

V˜a − Pa

|q

. (34)
Substituting in the expressions for DUa in eqn. (16) and P˜a in eqn. (4) and simplifying
allows eqn. (34) to be characterized as
−Ey˜,x˜

E

exp

−1
τ
DUa

V˜a − Pa

|q

= −Ey˜,x˜

exp

−1
2
(aU y˜ + bU x˜+ cU)
2

,
where
aU =
πδ
πε+πδ
− πξπε+πξ
αλτ
β2σ2f+N
−1(πε+πξ)
−1
+2αλτ
√
N
)
β
2
σ2f +N
−1 (πε + πδ)
−1
,
bU =
λ− πδπε+πδ
πε+πξ
πξ
	
λ+
β2σ2f+N
−1(πε+πξ)
−1
ατ


− αλτ
β2σ2f+N
−1(πε+πξ)
−1
+2αλτ
λ
√
N
)
β
2
σ2f +N
−1 (πε + πδ)
−1
,
cU =
αλτ
β2σ2f+N
−1(πε+πξ)
−1
+2αλτ
− πδπε+πδ
πε+πξ
πξ
√
N
)
β
2
σ2f +N
−1 (πε + πδ)
−1
θ.
Repeating the analysis above in eqns. (29)-(33), but with aU , bU , and cU in place of aI , bI ,
and cI , yields the following expression for an uninformed investor’s expected utility
−
*
πyπx
πxa2U + πyb
2
U + πxπy
exp

−1
2
πxπy (bU + cU)
2
πxa2U + πyb
2
U + πxπy

. (35)
The second step is to assume that each informed investor pays a per-informed-investor fee of
φ
N
, and then compute the ratio of an informed investor’s expected utility to an uninformed
investor’s expected utility: in eﬀect, the ratio of eqn. (33) to eqn. (35). For the moment,
let us refer to this ratio as “Ratio.” As in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), showing that for
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any φ
N
there exists an α∗, say, such that Ratio is 1 is tantamount to establishing that there
exists an α∗-fraction of informed investors versus a (1− α∗)-fraction of uninformed investors
such that an investor is indiﬀerent between paying the fee and becoming informed versus
remaining uninformed. This, in turn, is equivalent to computing
lim
N→∞
N · ln [Ratio] ,
and then showing that for any φ
N
there exists an α∗ such that limN→∞N · ln [Ratio] = 0.
Thus, our next step is to compute limN→∞N · ln [Ratio]; this calculation yields
lim
N→∞
N · ln [Ratio] = Ω (λ,α, β, τ ,σf , πε, πξ, πx) + 2φ
τ
, (36)
where Ω (·) can be expressed as the ratio of two 8th-order polynomials in α, where the
coeﬃcients to the α-polynomials are functions of λ, β, τ , σf , πε, πξ, and πx. Suﬃce it to say
that Ω (·) is a very complicated expression (we spare the reader the details). Exacerbating
the complication, however, is the fact that Ω (·), in addition to being a function of a host
of exogenous parameters, is also a function of λ and λ is an endogenous variable. For
example, from the proof to Proposition 2 in Appendix B, we know that λ has to satisfy
Λ (λ, ·) = c3λ3 + c2λ2 − c1λ− c0, where the coeﬃcients cj are defined by
c3 = α
2 (1− α) πε (πε + πξ) (τπf )3 ,
c2 = α (2− 3α) πε (πε + πξ) (τβπf )2 ,
c1 = ((1− α) πξπx (ατπf )2 + (3α− 1) πε (πε + πξ) β4)τπf ,
c0 = β
2

πε (πε + πξ) β
4 + α (τπf )
2
πξπx

,
and πf = σ−2f . Because the solution to λ is a 3
rd-order polynomial, solving for α and λ
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simultaneously results in Ω (·) implicitly being the ratio of two 11th-order polynomials in α,
where the coeﬃcients to the α-polynomials are functions of β, τ , σf , πε, πξ, and πx (all of
which are exogenous parameters). Despite the level of complexity, it is straightforward to
establish two facts: 1) α = 0 implies λ = τ−1β2σ2f (where σ
2
f = π
−1
f ); and 2) α → 1 implies
λ→∞. These two facts, in turn, imply
Ω

λ = τ−1β2σ2f ,α = 0, β, τ ,σf , πε, πξ, πx

= −πξ
πx
πξ + πx
(πε + πξ)
2
1
β
2
σ2f
,
and
lim
α→1
lim
λ→∞
Ω (λ,α, β, τ ,σf , πε, πξ, πx)→ +∞.
To summarize the discussion to this point, we have established that Ω (·), as a function
of α, has a range between − πξπx
πx+πξ
(πε+πξ)
2
1
β2σ2f
and +∞, and, as a ratio of polynomials in
α, is continuous and (mathematically) well-behaved. Collectively, this implies from the
intermediate value theorem that for any set of exogenous parameters β, τ , σf , πε, πξ, πx,
and φ ∈

0, τ
2
πξ
πx
πx+πξ
(πε+πξ)
2
1
β2σ2f

, there exists some α∗, say, such that
Ω (λ,α∗, β, τ ,σf , πε, πξ, πx) + 2
φ
τ
= 0.
This proves the claim in the statement of Lemma 1. Q.E.D.
An implication of α = 0. At first blush it may seem odd that that α = 0 implies
λ = τ−1β2σ2f because if α = 0 then there are no informed investors, and thus in the absence
of informed trade one might expect the market to be perfectly liquid (i.e., λ = 0). But
recall that investors’ conjecture about the price of the risky asset is that it is of the form
Pa = μa + θ + λ

αN · D˜Ia − x˜

, and so α = 0 implies that market illiquidity arises as a
consequence of (exclusively) random supply, x˜. In other words, random supply behaves like a
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large, uninformed investor who, despite being uninformed, nonetheless makes markets illiquid
through the impact of his demand on price. Here it may be useful to think of the random
supply (x˜) as a large, uninformed block trade. This points to the fact that information, per
se, is not a requirement for illiquidity: large demand orders, such as large block trades, are
suﬃcient to make markets illiquid. Thus, in equilibrium λ = τ−1β2σ2f . Nonetheless, when
α = 0 (i.e., in the absence of informed trade), the expression for the risk premium in eqn.
(23) reduces to the same expression for the risk premium as when the market is perfectly
competitive (τ−1β2σ2f): in other words, Δ

λ = τ−1β2σ2f , ...,α = 0, ...

= τ−1β2σ2f .
Appendix D - Results related to Section 5
In Appendix D we prove Proposition 4. As there is no private information about the com-
mon factor, we assume that all investors act as price takers in their demands for the traded
common factor. As in the previous section, uninformed investors act as price takers in their
demands for the risky asset whereas an intermediary coordinates the demands of informed
investors. Let DtT and Dta represent investors’ percentage demands for the common factor
and the risky asset, respectively, where t ∈ [I, U ] represents an investor’s type, either in-
formed (I) or uninformed (U). Finally, recall that we represent the price of the risky asset
as Pa, where the intermediary conjectures that Pa = μa + θ + λ (αNDIa − x). Henceforth
we represent the price of the common factor as PT .
The first step is to determine the 1st-order conditions that characterize informed and
uninformed investors’ demand for the risky asset and the common factor. In conjunction
with this, we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 2. The following equations characterize the 1st-order conditions that result from
the intermediary coordinating informed trade conditional on knowledge of y˜ = y and x˜ = x,
and an uninformed investor solving his optimization problem. For an informed investor, the
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1st-order conditions are
0 = μ− PT −
1
τ

σ2F + σ
2
T

DIT + βσ
2
FDIa

0 = E [ε˜|y]− θ − 2λαNDIa + λx− 1
τ

βσ2FDIT +

β
2
σ2F + V ar [ε˜|y]

DIa

;
and for an uninformed investor, the 1st-order conditions are
0 = μ− PT −
1
τ

σ2F + σ
2
T

DUT + βσ
2
FDUa

0 = μa + E [ε˜|q]− Pa −
1
τ

βσ2FDUT +

β
2
σ2F + V ar [ε˜|q]

DUa

.
Proof to Lemma 2. Let DI represent the 1-by-2 vector (DIT , DIa), and DTI its transpose.
With this specification of the economy, the intermediary solves the following optimization
problem for an informed investor conditional on knowledge of y˜ = y and x˜ = x:
max
DIT ,DIa
Eμ˜T
⎡
⎢⎣EV˜T ,V˜a
⎡
⎢⎣− exp
⎡
⎢⎣−1
τ
DI
⎛
⎜⎝
V˜T − PT
V˜a − Pa
⎞
⎟⎠
⎤
⎥⎦ |y, x
⎤
⎥⎦
⎤
⎥⎦
= max
DIT ,DIa
Eμ˜T
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
− exp
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
− 1τDI
⎛
⎜⎝
μ˜T − PT
E [ε˜|y]− θ − λαNDIa + λx
⎞
⎟⎠
+1
2
1
τ2DI
⎛
⎜⎝
σ2F βσ
2
F
βσ2F β
2
σ2F + V ar [ε˜|y]
⎞
⎟⎠DTI
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
= max
DIT ,DIa
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
− exp
⎡
⎢⎣
− 1τ (DIT (μ− PT ) +DIa (E [ε˜|y]− θ − λαNDIa + λx)) + 12τ2D2ITσ2T
+1
2
1
τ2

D2ITσ
2
F + 2DITDIaβσ
2
F +

β
2
σ2F + V ar [ε˜|y]

D2Ia

⎤
⎥⎦
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
.
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This yields the following 1st-order conditions for informed investors:
0 = μ− PT −
1
τ

σ2F + σ
2
T

DIT + βσ
2
FDIa

0 = E [ε˜|y]− θ − 2λαNDIa + λx− 1
τ

βσ2FDIT +

β
2
σ2F + V ar [ε˜|y]

DIa

.
LetDU represent the 1-by-2 vector (DUT , DUa), andDTU its transpose. Uninformed investors
condition their beliefs on PT and Pa to infer information about ε˜: let the statistic q˜ = q
represent the information inferred.19 Uninformed investors solve the following optimization
problem:
max
DUT ,DUa
Eμ˜T
⎡
⎢⎣EV˜T ,V˜a
⎡
⎢⎣− exp
⎡
⎢⎣−1
τ
DU
⎛
⎜⎝
V˜T − PT
V˜a − Pa
⎞
⎟⎠
⎤
⎥⎦ |q
⎤
⎥⎦
⎤
⎥⎦
= max
DUT ,DUa
Eμ˜T
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
− exp
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
− 1τDU
⎛
⎜⎝
μ˜T − PT
μa + E [ε˜|q]− Pa
⎞
⎟⎠
+1
2
1
τ2DU
⎛
⎜⎝
σ2F βσ
2
F
βσ2F β
2
σ2F + V ar [ε˜|q]
⎞
⎟⎠DTU
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
= max
DUT ,DUa
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
− exp
⎡
⎢⎣
− 1τ (DUT (μ− PT ) +DUa (μa + E [ε˜|q]− Pa)) + 12τ2D2UTσ2T
+1
2
1
τ2

D2UTσ
2
F + 2DUTDUaβσ
2
F +

β
2
σ2F + V ar [ε˜|q]

D2Ua

⎤
⎥⎦
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
.
This yields the following 1st-order conditions for uninformed investors:
0 = μ− PT −
1
τ

σ2F + σ
2
T

DUT + βσ
2
FDUa

0 = μa + E [ε˜|q]− Pa −
1
τ

βσ2FDUT +

β
2
σ2F + V ar [ε˜|q]

DUa

.
Q.E.D.
19 Here, q˜ could be a vector of statistics (one each from PM and Pa) or a scalar if PM is not an additional
source of information about ε˜.
54
The next step is to implement these 1st-order conditions to determine market-clearing prices.
Recall that x˜ represents the supply of the risky asset available for trade among informed and
uninformed investors. Allowing investors to diversify into the common factor as a separate
asset raises the possibility that PT will depend on x˜, and in this circumstance uninformed
investors can use PT to improve their inferences about ε˜ from Pa. This complicates the
problem considerably without having any qualitative eﬀect on the results we report below.
The reason it has no qualitative eﬀect is that the key insight of our analysis is that only
risk associated with the systematic component of the risky asset’s cash flow manifests in the
risk premium when investors can trade the common factor, and this insight is unrelated to
uninformed investors’ level of informedness — and hence unrelated to whether uninformed
investors infer additional information from PT . Thus, to facilitate the discussion, here we
assume that the supply of the common factor available for trade is − σ
2
F
σ2F+σ
2
T
βx˜: this assump-
tion, in conjunction with the 1st-order conditions, yields PT = μ, and when PT = μ there is
no additional information to be inferred from PT . Below we discuss how our analysis extends
to the case where PT is an additional source of information about ε˜: see “Extension to PT
as additional information.”
Let Θ = σ
2
F σ
2
T
σ2F+σ
2
T
β
2. To determine Pa when PT = μ, we employ the 1st-order conditions to
derive investors’ demands for the risky asset. This yields:
DIa = τ
E [ε˜|y]− θ + xλ
2ταNλ+Θ+ V ar [ε˜|y] and DUa = τ
μa + E [ε˜|q]− Pa
Θ+ V ar [ε˜|q] . (37)
Using the same logic as in Section 3, one can use the demands for the risky asset in eqn.
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(37) to show
Pa − μa =
Θ+ V ar [ε˜|q]
τ (1− α)N (αNDIa − x) +
πδ
πε + πδ
(q˜ − E [q˜])
=

Θ+ V ar [ε˜|q]
τ (1− α)N +
2λ+ 1ταN (Θ+ V ar [ε˜|y])
πε+πδ
πδ
πξ
πε+πξ

(αNDIa − x)−
πδ
πε + πδ
E [q˜] ,
where here
q˜ = y˜ − πε + πξ
πξ
	
θ +
	
λ+
1
ταN
(Θ+ V ar [ε˜|y])


x˜


and (38)
πδ =

π−1ξ +
	
πε + πξ
πξ
	
λ+
1
ταN
(Θ+ V ar [ε˜|y])


2
π−1x
−1
. (39)
To sustain the conjecture Pa = μa + θ + λ (αNDIa − x), it must be the case that λ solves
λ =
Θ+ V ar [ε˜|q]
τ (1− α)N +
πδ (πε + πξ)
πξ (πε + πδ)
	
2λ+
1
ταN
(Θ+ V ar [ε˜|y])


, (40)
and θ solves
θ =
πδ
πε
πξ + πε
πξ − πδ
	
λ+
1
ταN
(Θ+ V ar [ε˜|y])


. (41)
Our next step is to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 3. There exists a unique, positive λ∗ that satisfies eqn. (40). In turn, the λ∗ can
be used to solve for a (unique) πδ in eqn. (39) and (unique) θ in eqn. (41).
Proof to Lemma 3. Let πT represent the reciprocal of σ2T . Expressed in terms of precisions,
Θ = β
2
πF+πT
. Define Λ (λ, ·) as
Λ (λ, ·) = λ− Θ+ (πε + πδ)
−1
τ (1− α)N −
πδ (πε + πξ)
πξ (πε + πδ)
	
2λ+
1
ταN

Θ+ (πε + πξ)
−1


, (42)
and then substitute in the expression for πδ in eqn. (39) and then solve for λ. Ignoring
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proportionality factors, this yields the following expression for Λ (λ, ·): Λ (λ, ·) = c3λ3 +
c2λ
2 − c1λ− c0, where the coeﬃcients cj are defined by
c3 = (Nτ (πF + πT ))
3
πε (πε + πξ)
2
α2 (1− α) ,
c2 = (Nτ (πF + πT ))
2 (πε + πξ)α

πε (2− 3α)

πF + πT + β
2 (πε + πξ)

− α (πF + πT ) πξ

,
c1 = Nτ (πF + πT ) ((Nτα (πF + πT ))
2
πξ (πε + πξ) πx (1− α)
+

πF + πT + β
2 (πε + πξ)
 
πε (3α− 1)

πF + πT + β
2 (πε + πξ)

+ 2α (πF + πT ) πξ

),
c0 =

πF + πT + β
2 (πε + πξ)

× πF + πT + β2πε
 
πF + πT + β
2 (πε + πξ)

+ (Nτ (πF + πT ))
2
απξπx

.
Note that c3 and c0 are both positive, but the signs of c2 and c1 are indeterminate. Because
c3 and c0 are both positive, there exists some λ > 0 that solves Λ (λ, ·) = 0. For Λ (λ, ·) = 0
to have multiple, positive λ-roots, Descartes’ rule of signs requires that c2 and c1 both be
negative (when c3 and c0 are both positive). A necessary and suﬃcient condition that c2
is negative is that α >
2πε(πF+πT+β2(πε+πξ))
3πε(πF+πT+β2(πε+πξ))+(πF+πT )πξ
, and a necessary (but not suﬃcient)
condition that c1 is negative is that α <
πε(πF+πε+πξ)
3πε(πF+πT+β2(πε+πξ))+2(πF+πT )πξ
. But there is no
α that satisfies both necessary conditions, and so c2 and c1 cannot both be negative: this
establishes the existence of a unique λ > 0 that satisfies Λ (λ, ·) = 0. One can employ a proof
nearly identical to the one in Proposition 1 to establish that d
dλΛ (λ
∗, ·) > 0, and Λ

λˆ, ·

< 0
implies λˆ < λ∗. Q.E.D.
Finally, and as in Section 3, we evaluate whether πε and πξ manifest in the risky asset’s risk
premium as the number of investors becomes large, where the risk premium is the diﬀerence
in its expected cash flow relative to its beginning-of-period price: Δ (λ, ·) = E
'
V˜a − P˜a
(
.
Specifically, we prove the following proposition.
Proof to Proposition 4. First, determine Λ (λ, ·) when π−1F = Nπ−1f as N becomes large.
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To do this, substitute in the expression for πδ in eqn. (39) into eqn. (42) and then solve for
λ as N becomes large; unlike the expression for Λ (λ, ·) in Lemma 3, however, here do not
ignore proportionality factors because these factors are a function of N . When it is either the
case that there is no structural uncertainty (i.e., πT →∞) or the uncertainty is finite (i.e.,
π−1T is finite), the (unique, positive) λ
∗ that solves Λ (λ∗, ·) = 0 is λ∗ =
)
πξπx
πε(πε+πξ)
. Finally,
determine Δ (λ, ·) when π−1F = Nπ−1f as N becomes large. Substituting in λ∗ =
)
πξπx
πε(πε+πξ)
into Δ (λ, ·) yields Δ (λ∗, ·) = 0. To prove the second part of the proposition, now allow
π−1T = Nπ
−1
μ and re-do the first part. Here Δ (λ, ·) does not go to 0 and has a unique,
positive λ-root: call this root λˆ. Next, show that Λ

λˆ, ·

< 0 and hence λˆ < λ∗ (the proof
is nearly identical to the one in Proposition 1 and so we simply assert this result in the
Proof to Lemma 3); this, in turn, implies that Δ (λ∗, ·) > 0 because Δ (λ, ·) increases as λ
increases. Finally, the expression for Δ (λ∗, ·) is
Δ (λ∗, ·) =
	
αλ
∗ + β
2
τ(πf+πμ)


λ
∗ − απξπx
πε(πε+πξ)
2αλ∗ + β
2
τ(πf+πμ)
;
this expression is directly a function of πε and πξ, and indirectly a function of πε and πξ
through λ∗. Q.E.D.
Extension to PT as additional information. The extension to the general case where
PT provides additional information is straightforward in that it requires primarily that one
re-define πδ. To elaborate on this issue, start by letting z˜ represent the random supply of
the common factor available for trade, where z˜ has a normal distribution with mean 1 and
precision πz. Using the 1st-order conditions, the price of the common factor reduces to
PT = μ−
1
NτπF
	
πF + πT
πT
z˜ + βx˜


.
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Because PT depends on x˜, an uninformed investor can use PT to infer information about x˜
with “noise” (i.e., z˜), which, in turn, can be used to improve his inference about y˜ from Pa.
For example, define the statistic r˜ by
r˜ =
μ− PT
1
NτπF
β
= x˜+
πF + πT
βπT
z˜.
Note that r˜ has a normal distribution with a mean of E [r˜] = 1 + πF+πTβπT and variance
V ar [r˜] = π−1x +

πF+πT
βπT
2
π−1z . Let Π represent the 1-by-2 vector Π = (π−1ε , 0) and Q the
2-by-2 matrix
Q =
⎛
⎜⎝
V ar [q˜] Cov [q˜, r˜]
Cov [q˜, r˜] V ar [r˜]
⎞
⎟⎠ ,
where q˜ is defined as in eqn. (38). By conditioning their beliefs on Pa and PT , uninformed
investors will assess the mean and variance of ε˜ conditional on q˜ = q and r˜ = r as:
E [ε˜|q, r] = Π ·Q−1 ·
⎛
⎜⎝
q − E [q˜]
r − E [r˜]
⎞
⎟⎠ and V ar [ε˜|q, r] = π−1ε −Π ·Q−1 ·ΠT .
Having defined E [ε˜|q, r] and V ar [ε˜|q, r], the expressions for λ, θ, andΔ (λ, ·) remain roughly
similar (but not identical) to eqns. (40), (41), and (42). In eﬀect, one can extend Proposition
4 to the case where uninformed investors can use PT to infer information about x˜. The
extension is very complicated, however, and yields little additional insight.
59
